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נטלים וחזקות - דין ומהות

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מבוא - חזקות והשפעתן על נטל ההוכחה

ה"חזקה" הינה אמצעי הוכחה, וככזו נמנית היא על הראיות העומדות בפני בית-המשפט בעת מתן פסק-דינו, במשפט הפלילי או במשפט האזרחי {י' קדמי על הראיות, חלק שלישי, 1560}.

ניתן לומר, כי ה"חזקה", במובנים מסויימים, אינה אלא מכשיר נוסף המשפיע על שיקול-דעתו של בית-המשפט. ואולם, יש הרואים חשיבות ב"חזקות" לסוגיהן כגורם משפיע על נטל ההוכחה, העברת הנטל ועוד {א' הרנון דיני ראיות, חלק ראשון, 193}.

מיונן של ה"חזקות" לקבוצות של "חזקות" אף הוא מצא את פתרונו באורח שונה אצל מלומדי המשפט. פרופ' א' הרנון {שם, 193 ואילך}, יוצר למעשה ארבע קבוצות של "חזקות".

האחת, "חזקות שבהנחה", לאמור, חזקה הקובעת הנחה מסויימת הקיימת כל עוד לא הובאה ראיה לסתור הנחה זו.

השניה, חזקה המתקיימת אך ורק עם קיומה של עובדת יסוד, לאמור, חזקה המורה כי בהתקיים עובדה מסויימת רשאי בית-המשפט להסיק קיומה של עובדה אחרת.

השלישית, חזקה שבעובדה, לאמור, "החזקה הינה הסקה מותרת של מסקנה הנובעת מניסיון החיים, ללא צורך בהבאת ראיות להוכחתה, אין כל חובה להגיע למסקנה כזאת, אפילו לא הובאה כל ראיה נוגדת" {א' הרנון, שם, 194}.

הרביעית, חזקות שבחוק - בקבוצה זו מכיר המחבר בשתי סוגי חזקות. חזקות שבחוק הניתנות לסתירה - שהן חזקות רגילות או יחסיות, או חזקות חלוטות - חזרות שאינן ניתנות לסתירה.

המלומד י' קדמי, בספרו {שם, 1561}, ממיין את החזקות לשלוש קבוצות. האחת, חזקה שבעובדה. השניה, חזקה שבחוק. השלישית, חזקה חלוטה.

נראה הדבר, שאין כל משמעות למיון כזה או אחר, אלא יש לבחון את תוכנה של כל חזקה וחזקה, מידת השפעתה על שיקול-דעתו של בית-המשפט וכן השפעתה על נטל ההוכחה {אם כי לדעתינו, מיונו של פרופ' א' הרנון הוא המיון הנוח יותר לבחינת השפעותיו האמורות}.

דרך פעולתן של מרבית החזקות הינה עקיפה. לאמור, על-מנת שתקום החזקה יש להוכיח תשתית עובדתית נסיבתית המולידה את המסקנה המתחייבת מן החזקה {י' קדמי, שם, 1560}.

בתארם את החזקות כ"בת הדודה" של סוגיית "נטל ההוכחה" נאמר על-ידי מקורמיק, בספרו {על הראיות (מהדורה רביעית), 578, פסקה 342}:

"Presumptions: In General
One ventures the assertion that "presumption" is the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin, "burden of proof." One author has listed no less than eight senses in which the term has been used by the courts. Agreement can probably be secured to this extent, however: a presumption is a standardized practice, under which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts.
Returning for a moment to the discussion of satisfying the burden of producing evidence, assume that a party having the burden of producing evidence of fact A, introduces proof of fact B. The judge, using ordinary reasoning, may determine that fact A might reasonably be inferred from fact B, and therefore that the party has satisfied its burden, or as sometimes put by the courts, has made out a "prima facie" case. The judge has not used a presumption in the sense of a standardized practice, but rather has simply relied upon a rational inference. However, in ruling on a motion for directed verdict the judge may go beyond her own mental processes and experience and find that prior decisions or existing statutes have established that proof of fact B is sufficient to permit the jury to infer the existence of fact A. The judge has thus used a standardized practice but has the court nec-essarily used a presumption? Although some courts have described such a standardized inference as a presumption, most legal scholars have disagreed. They have saved the term to describe a significantly different sort of a rule, one that dictates not only that the establishment of fact B is sufficient to satisfy a party's burden of producing evidence with regard to fact A, but also at least compels the shifting of the burden of producing evidence on the question to the party's adversary. Under this view, if proof of fact B is introduced and a presumption exists to the effect that fact A can be inferred from fact B, the party denying the existence of fact A must then introduce proof of its nonexistence or risk having a verdict directed or a finding made against it. Further some authorities state that a true presumption should not only shift the burden of producing evidence, but also require that the party denying the existence of the presumed fact assume the burden of persuasion on the issue as well.
Certainly the description of a presumption as a rule that, at a minimum, shifts the burden of producing evidence is to be preferred, at least in civil cases. Inferences that a trial judge decides may reasonably be drawn from the evidence need no other description, even though the judge relies upon precedent or a statute rather than personal experience in reaching a decision. In most instances, the application of any other label to an inference will only cause confusion. In criminal cases, however, there are rules that traditionally have been labeled presumptions, even though they do not operate to shift even the burden of producing evidence. The jury is permitted but not required to accept the existence of the presumed fact even in the absence of contrary evidence. Recently, the Supreme Court resurrected the term "permissive presumption" to describe these rules. The term presumption will be used in this text in the preferred sense discussed above in referring to civil cases, but with the qualification suggested in referring to criminal cases.
There are rules of law that are often incorrectly called presumptions that should be specifically distinguished from presumptions at this point:
Conclusive presumptions. The term pre-sumption as used above always denotes a rebuttable presumption, i.e. the party against whom the presumption operates can always introduce proof in contradiction. In the case of what is commonly called a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption, when fact B is proven, fact A must be taken as true, and the adversary is not allowed to dispute this at all. For example, if it is proven that a child is under seven years of age, the courts have stated that it is conclusively presumed that she could not have committed a felony. In so doing, the courts are not stating a presumption at all, but simply expressing the rule of law that someone under seven years old cannot legally be convicted of a felony.
Res ipsa loquitur. Briefly and perhaps oversimply stated, res ipsa loquitur is a rule that provides that a plaintiff may satisfy his burden of producing evidence of a defendant's negligence by proving that the plaintiff has been injured by a casualty of a sort that normally would not have occurred in the absence of the defendant's negligence. Although a few jurisdictions have given the doctrine the effect of a true presumption even to the extent of using it to assign the burden of persuasion, most courts agree that it simply describes an inference of negligence. Prosser called it a "simple matter of circumstantial evidence." Most frequently, the inference called for by the doctrine is one that a court would properly have held to be reasonable even in the absence of a special rule. Where this is so, res ipsa loquitur certainly need be viewed no differently from any other inference. Moreover, even where the doctrine is artificial where it is imposed for reasons of policy rather than logic - it nevertheless remains only an inference, permitting but not requiring, the jury to find negligence. The only difference is that where res ipsa loquitur is artificially imposed, there is better reason for informing the jury of the permissi-bility of the inference than there is in the case where the doctrine simply describes a rational inference. Although theoretically a jury instruction of this kind might be viewed as violating a state rule prohibiting comment on the evidence, the courts have had little difficulty with the problem and have consistently approved and required, where requested, instructions that tell the jury that a finding of negligence is permissible. Obviously these instructions can and should be given without the use of the misnomer "presumption".
The presumption of innocence. Assign-ments of the burdens of proof prior to trial are not based on presumptions. Before trial no evidence has been introduced from which other facts are to be inferred. The assignment is made on the basis of a rule of substantive law providing that one party or the other ought to have one or both of the bur-dens with regard to an issue. In some in-stances, however, these substantive rules are incorrectly referred to as presumptions. The most glaring example of this mislabeling is the "presumption of innocence" as the phrase is used in criminal cases. The phrase is probably better called the "assumption of innocence" in that it describes our assumption that, in the absence of contrary facts, it is to be assumed that any person's conduct upon a given occasion was lawful. In criminal cases, the "presumption of innocence" has been adopted by judges as a convenient introduction to the statement of the burdens upon the prosecution, first of producing evidence of the guilt of the accused and, second, of finally persuading the jury or judge of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Most courts insist on the inclusion of the phrase in the charge to the jury, despite the fact that at that point it consists of nothing more than an amplifica-tion of the prosecution's burden of persuasion. Although the phrase is technically inaccurate and perhaps even misleading in the sense that it suggests that there is some inherent probability that the defendant is innocent, it is a basic component of a fair trial. Like the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it at least indicates to the jury that if a mistake is to be made it should be made in favor of the accused, or as Wigmore stated, "the term does convey a special and perhaps useful hint … in that it cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced. "